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Abstract
Background: Results-Based Financing (RBF) has proliferated in health sectors of low and middle income countries,
especially fragile and conflict-affected ones, and has been presented as a way of reforming and strengthening
strategic purchasing. However, few studies have empirically examined how RBF impacts on health care purchasing
in these settings. This article examines the effects of several RBF programmes on health care purchasing functions
in three fragile and post-conflict settings: Uganda, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over
the past decade.
Methods: The article is based on a documentary review, including 110 documents from 2004 to 2018, and 98 key
informant (KI) interviews conducted with international, national and district level stakeholders in early 2018 in the
selected districts of the three countries. Interviews and analysis followed an adapted framework for strategic
purchasing, which was also used to compare across the case studies.
Results: Across the cases, at the government level, we find little change to the accountability of purchasers, but
RBF does mobilise additional resources to support entitlements. In relation to the population, RBF appears to bring
in improvements in specifying and informing about entitlements for some services. However, the engagement and
consultation with the population on their needs was found to be limited. In relation to providers, RBF did not
impact in any major way on provider accreditation and selection, or on treatment guidelines. However, it did
introduce a more contractual relationship for some providers and bring about (at least partial) improvements in
provider payment systems, data quality, increased financial autonomy for primary providers and enforcing equitable
strategies. More generally, RBF has been a source of much-needed revenue at primary care level in under-funded
health systems. The context – particularly the degree of stability and authority of government–, the design of the
RBF programme and the potential for effective integration of RBF in existing systems and its stage of development
were key factors behind differences observed.
Conclusions: Our evidence suggests that expectations of RBF as an instrument of systemic reform should be
nuanced, while focusing instead on expanding the key areas of potential gain and ensuring better integration and
institutionalisation, towards which two of the three case study countries are working.
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Background
Over the last decade, results based financing (RBF) has
been increasingly implemented in low and middle in-
come countries, and especially in fragile and
conflict-affected states (FCAS) [1]. Under RBF pro-
grammes, funds are made conditional on agreed outputs
or outcomes, often with quality adjustments [2]. While
research and evidence on RBF has grown since the first
systematic review [3], it has mostly focused on the
effectiveness of RBF and there remain some very signifi-
cant gaps in our understanding of it, in particular in
relation to RBF as a health system strengthening inter-
vention [4]. In particular, supply-side RBF – sometimes
called performance based financing (PBF), although here
we use the term RBF - has been presented as a health
system intervention with the potential to drive a more
strategic approach to purchasing [5, 6]. However there
has been limited empirical study of RBF’s actual impact
on strategic purchasing arrangements in practice in low
and middle income (and especially fragile) countries and
settings. This article aims to start filling that gap by
examining the experiences of three case study countries
– Uganda, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC) – all of which have adopted RBF in
different ways and at different scales over the past dec-
ade. Improving strategic purchasing is increasingly seen
as an essential step, and one of the most effective strat-
egies to accelerate and sustain progress towards univer-
sal health coverage, as a way to get more value from the
money invested in the health sector through improved
health systems efficiency [7]. How strategic purchasing
is understood and conceptualised varies in the literature,
but we adapt a recently published framework, which
outlines core functions that strategic purchasing implies
by level – in relation to government roles, populations
served, and providers [8]. We used this framework to
inform our understanding of ‘strategic purchasing’ as
well as to guide the data collection and analysis.
The three countries have experienced different types
of fragility, conflict and crisis. The DRC has experienced
periodic violence stretching back to colonial days, and
more recently influenced by armed groups fleeing the
Rwandan genocide, leading to humanitarian catastrophe
in the east of the country, political upheaval and then
stalemate [9]. Fragility features include the quasi absence
of state services, such as justice, health care and security,
for which local populations have to rely on a network of
state and non-state actors [10, 11]. This has provided a
policy vacuum in which non-government organisation
(NGO) and donor-led experiments such as RBF could
thrive. By contrast, Zimbabwe has had a single govern-
ment since independence in 1980, but experienced pro-
longed economic and political crisis, culminating in
hyper-inflation and collapse of public services in 2008.
Resource constraints were amongst the main triggers for
adoption of RBF in the health sector in 2011 [12]. Uganda
had a general civil war ending in 1986 [13]. However, con-
flict continued in the northern region until the Lord’s Re-
sistance Army, an insurgent group, was expelled in 2006
and peace talks began [14]. In this context, RBF was
adopted to improve health services not just in areas recov-
ering from conflict but across the country [15].
Table 1 provides an overview of the history of RBF
schemes which are the focus of our study in the three
settings.
Methods
Study design
This study adopts a comparative case study design, and
is qualitative and largely retrospective. In each of the set-
tings, we focus on one or more RBF programmes,
selected because of their relevance to our research ques-
tion, in terms of strategic purchasing arrangements (for
example, for the selection of RBF programmes in DRC)
or in terms of relation to conflict-affected settings (e.g.
for Uganda we have focused on programmes operating
in the north). A set of common data collection and data
analysis tools were developed at the beginning of the
research, based on the analytical framework on strategic
purchasing that we adopted (Table 2). Tools were then
adapted at country level to better fit the context and
type of data available. Data were collected through a
series of key informant interviews and were integrated
with analysis of documentation.
Study sites
DRC
Data collection was carried out remotely, but refers to
two RBF programmes carried out in the provinces of
Kasai Occidental and Oriental, North Kivu and Province
Orientale (EU-funded FED programme), and Katanga,
Équateur, Bandundu and Maniema (World Bank-funded
PDSS programme).
Zimbabwe
Data collection was done at national level and in two
provinces (Midlands and Mashonaland East), including
four districts (Murewa, Marondera, Gokwe North and
Gokwe South). These provinces were selected as they
were the sites for the frontrunner districts in 2011. The
districts were chosen as representing one each from the
two schemes (Cordaid and Crown Agents) per province
and including the two original pilot districts [16].
Uganda
Primary data collection was conducted at the national
and sub national levels. For the sub national level, dis-
tricts in Acholi and Lango sub-region, where the
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NuHealth, SDS and SMGL schemes had been imple-
mented, were selected. The study districts included
Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum, Lira and Oyam.
Data collection
Document review
Documents concerning the three countries of analysis
were gathered based on previous studies and research
carried out by the authors [10, 15, 17] as well as
through direct knowledge of the context. Moreover,
key informants were asked to provide additional doc-
uments as relevant. Documents reviewed included a
few published articles, as well as unpublished docu-
ments relating to the health sector (e.g., policies and
strategies) and RBF documents (e.g., implementation
manuals, sample of contracts, list of indicators,
internal and external evaluations, presentations, and
annual reviews). In total, 23 documents were reviewed
for DRC, dating between 2008 and 2017. For
Zimbabwe, 60 documents were reviewed, dating from
2008 to 2018, the vast majority of which were
operational and grey literature. In Uganda 27 docu-
ments were reviewed, dating between 2004 and 2018.
Key informant interviews
Key informants interviews were carried out in all set-
tings using similar semi-structured interview guides. The
guides were developed based on the elements of the
framework that we adopted (Table 2) and were adapted
in each setting to better capture the specificities of the
context and of the interviewing process. In each setting,
the interviewees were selected purposefully, aiming to be
as comprehensive as possible of all the actors involved
in the RBF programmes considered. However, there are
some variations in the number of respondents across the
three countries which are due to the availability and
accessibility of key actors in the different settings.
Table 1 Summary of key features of RBF in the case studies
DRC Zimbabwe Uganda
RBF adoption process – RBF introduced since 2005 (earliest
RBF adopted among the three
cases)
– First RBF project in South Kivu
implemented by the NGO Cordaid
– Followed by a number of other
projects funded by the European
Union, World Bank, USAID, and
other NGOs in different provinces
[1, 45].
– Since 2011 [12]
– WB-funded and Cordaid-
implemented
pilot in two districts (Maron-
dera and Zvishavane), then
in an additional 16 districts
– Scaled up to cover the
entire country in 2014: HDF-
funded and Crown Agents-
implemented
– Since 2009
– Numerous RBF schemes, all
donor funded,
with the World Bank being
one of the
major donors [57–59], but
also other
schemes implemented by
Cordaid in Jinja
(2009–2015) and recently by
the Belgian
Development Agency,
Enabel (formerly
BTC) in West Nile and
Rwenzori regions.
Main reasons of RBF adoption Policy vacuum left room for NGO/
donor-led experiments
Resource constraints as trigger
for RBF adoption
RBF adopted to mitigate
financial
constraints in private sector
and improve
services across the country,
including in the
North
Focus of this study EU-funded project (9th FED) and the
ongoing World Bank-funded
Programme de Développement de
Services de Santé project (PDSS).
The reason is that both schemes
make use of newly-created semi-
autonomous purchasing agencies
(établissements d’utilité publique, EUPs
– see Annex 1).
Both RBF schemes, covering
the entire country
RBF pilots in the post-conflict
northern
region
– World Bank’s Saving
Mothers, Giving Lives (SMGL)
(2012–2017)
– DFID’s NuHealth (2011–2016)
– USAID’s Strengthening
Decentralisation for
Sustainability (SDS) (2011–
2017).
Impact evaluation No impact evaluation published so
far for the selected RBF programmes
An impact evaluation has
been conducted by the World
Bank in the original districts
[42]. However, no independent
research on RBF’s health
system effects has yet been
published.
Mid-term impact for SMGL
shows a 30%
reduction in maternal death.
Other
programmes are yet to be
evaluated.
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DRC For the DRC, 9 key informant interviews were car-
ried out in March and April 2018, with representatives
of the MoH at central and decentralised level (n = 2),
EUP staff (n = 2) and international technical assistants
involved in the support to and implementation of RBF
programmes and EUPs in particular (n = 5). The selec-
tion aimed to cover as much as possible those involved
in the RBF programmes considered, and specifically in
the establishment and management of the EUPs as pur-
chasing agencies. Some interviewees were identified
based on their roles, while others were contacted based
on suggestions from previous key informants. Interviews
were carried out in French and remotely, via phone,
WhatsApp or Skype. Interviews were recorded and de-
tailed notes taken.
Zimbabwe Forty key informant interviews were con-
ducted for Zimbabwe between February and March
2018. They included Ministry of Health staff at national
(n = 5), provincial (n = 6) and district levels (n = 7); staff
from other public bodies and ministries (n = 3); develop-
ment partners (n = 10); RBF consultants (n = 3); and
RBF implementers (n = 6). Purposive sampling was used
to identify key informants at national, provincial and dis-
trict levels, based on their knowledge and involvement
on RBF from its inception till the present. The selection
of interviewees was as comprehensive as possible, in-
cluding individuals currently holding RBF-related posts
or who were previously in such positions. A number of
relevant organizations, groups and individuals involved
in RBF were preliminarily identified. New individuals
were added based on the results of the documentary
review or as suggested by key informants.
Key informants were interviewed in English. Most
interviews took place in the informant’s place of work,
but in a location where privacy was assured. Some inter-
views were conducted by phone or Skype, where phys-
ical distance or access necessitated it. Interviews focused
on the period from 2008 (prior to RBF introduction) to
present and were tailored to the time available and the
knowledge of the KI. Interviews lasted from 30min to
two hours, with an average of one hour. Interviews were
recorded where informants were comfortable with that,
and detailed notes were taken.
Uganda A total of 49 interviews with key informants
were analysed for the purpose of this study, including
from the Ministry of Health (n = 4); Ministry of Finance/
Presidency (n = 2); development partners (n = 6);
non-governmental organisations and implementers (n =
13; consultants and auditors (n = 3); district local gov-
ernment staff (n = 6); and facility managers (n = 15).
Thirty-five were composed of transcripts of earlier key
informant interviews which were reanalysed. These
interviews were conducted by Makerere University
School of Public Health in 2015 [15]. An additional 14
interviews were undertaken in 2018 in order to focus on
questions relating to the impacts on strategic purchas-
ing, with a greater emphasis on the experience in north-
ern Uganda. The interviews lasted from 35min to two
hours. All the 14 additional interviews were recorded,
except two. In these cases, the participants were
Table 2 Key actions for strategic purchasing in relation to different stakeholders within the health system
Key strategic purchasing actions by government • Establish clear frameworks for purchaser(s) and providers
• Ensure accountability of purchaser(s)
• Ensure adequate resources mobilised
• Fill service delivery infrastructure gaps
Key strategic purchasing actions in relation to citizens/
population served
• Assess needs, preferences, values of the population to
specify benefits
• Inform the population of entitlements, establish mechanisms
for complaints and feedback, publicly report on use of resources
and performance
Key strategic purchasing actions in relation to providers • Select (accredit) providers
• Establish service agreements/contracts
• Design, implement, modify provider payment methods to
encourage efficiency and quality
• Establish provider payment rates and pay providers regularly
• Allocate resources equitably, implement other strategies to
promote equitable access and monitor user payment policies
• Develop, manage and use information systems, secure information
on services provided, monitor/supervise provider performance and
act on poor performance, audit provider claims, protect against fraud and corruption
Source: authors’ adaptation based on [8]
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uncomfortable with being recorded and preferred that
the research team takes only notes.
Data analysis
Data analysis was done iteratively. A first analysis of the
documents collected was conducted before the inter-
views in the field, and guided the discussion during
interviews. Later on, new documents were added to the
review, and a final round of analysis carried out. For all
countries, both documents and key informant interviews
were analysed using thematic analysis. The initial ana-
lysis was carried out separately by each country team
and consisted in coding the text (documents or inter-
view notes or transcripts) based on the predefined list of
categories which identified the key elements of strategic
purchasing in relation to government, populations and
providers in our analytic framework [8], which was
modified to reduce the categories of analysis and
adapted to the specific contexts (Table 2). Data analysis
was carried out manually for Zimbabwe and DRC and
using Atlas ti version 7.0 for Uganda.
During a workshop in June 2018, the teams shared
their findings and prepared a three-country matrix, com-
paring the key results against each of the elements of
strategic purchasing identified in the table. The com-
parative matrix and the team discussion that followed
enabled comparison across cases (reported in the find-
ings section), identifying common patterns and differ-
ences and deriving higher level conclusions, which are
presented in the ‘discussion’ section.
Ethical approval
Ethics approval was obtained from Queen Margaret
University’s Research Ethics Panel. Additional ethics
clearance for primary data collected at country level was
also granted by the Makerere University School of Public
Health, Ethics Review Board, and the Uganda National
Council for Science and technology (SS4500), as well as
the Medical Research Council of Zimbabwe (MRCZ/A/
2265). The study also received authorisation from the
MoHCC in Zimbabwe.
Results
The findings section first provides some background on
the RBF programmes included in this study, focusing
specifically on the strategic purchasing arrangements it
established or modified. Secondly, it presents the results
of our analysis in relation to the key actions for strategic
purchasing, following the structure of Table 2 above.
Overview of RBF programme and its role in purchasing
DRC
In the DRC, we specifically looked at two of the RBF
programmes that have been implemented recently. The
9th FED programme was funded by the European Union
from 2005 to 2010 (another EU-funded project followed
but under different design and arrangements, not expli-
citly considered here). It was Implemented in the prov-
inces of Kasai Occidental (where it covered 16 Health
Zones), Kasai Oriental (21 zones), North Kivu (15 zones)
and Province Orientale (12 zones).The Programme de
Développement de Services de Santé (PDSS) is mainly
funded by the World Bank with contributions also from
Global Fund, UNICEF, UNFPA, USAID, GAVI. It started
in 2017 in the provinces of Katanga, Équateur,
Bandundu and Maniema,1 with the aim of covering 140
zones in total. Broadly, the aim of both RBF programmes
was to inject funding in an extremely underfunded and
cash-strapped system to improve the quality and also
the accessibility and coverage of health services.
The design of the two RBF programmes is slightly dif-
ferent, but both make use of contracts with public and
faith-based facilities and health authorities at zonal
(Zonal Health Teams - Equipes Cadre de Zone, ECZ)
and provincial level (Provincial Health Divisions -
Divisions Provinciales de Santé, DPS) to provide health
or health management services as defined in the con-
tracts in exchange of a cash payment made to facilities
which can be used to cover staff bonuses and facility’s
running costs and small investments [18]. However, both
programmes also included a component of non-per-
formance based support in cash or in kind [19].
The specificity in the design of both RBF programmes
compared to others in the DRC and elsewhere is the
creation and use of a semi-autonomous purchasing
agency, established at provincial level. These agencies
are commonly called EUPs based on the acronym of
‘établissements d’utilité publique’ (EUPs, public service
agencies – Annex 1).2 Their creation as an innovative
institutional model was “a bit of an accidental decision”,
according to key informants. Initially, the EUPs were
created by AEDES, the international implementing
agency of the FED project, in order to respond to the
need to reconcile EU procedures and fiduciary concerns
with the preference for national structures, ownership,
and long-term sustainability. Based on this, the EUPs
were created by AEDES in 2008 as semi-autonomous
entities, delegated by the Ministry of Health and the
Ministry of Finance to implement a public mission,
namely to manage EU funding to purchase health ser-
vices. The key informants involved in the creation and
early management of the EUPs stressed how the EUPs
were envisaged to move fund pooling and management
to a decentralized level, with the double aim of improv-
ing flexibility and autonomy at that level in the DRC,
where the central level struggles to control the
periphery [9], but also to strengthen accountability
and trust in the financial system. As a semi-public
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body with representatives of government, donors and
civil society, the EUPs were seen as having this
potential. Many viewed the EUPs as a potential tool
for pooling and channelling funds to health facilities
from different sources, including multiple donors (a
sort of provincial basket fund), but also from govern-
ment at national and provincial levels, as well as from
health insurance or mutuelles, effectively becoming
the sole purchasing agency in the provinces.
Zimbabwe
While the experience in DRC is one of donor projects
establishing new structures at provincial and district
levels, in Zimbabwe, RBF developed in the context of a
national system which, though battered by economic
and political crisis, retained its integrated system, which
had been one of the stronger performers in Africa
pre-crisis [16]. The initial model was developed by the
Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) in partner-
ship with the World Bank and Cordaid, and guided by a
national RBF steering committee. The RBF programme
funded 16 reproductive, maternal and child health
(MCH) indicators at rural health centre (RHC) level and
five at referral level, with payments linked to number of
outputs, with additional payments for quality and re-
moteness [20]. It scaled up relatively quickly from the
initial 18 districts to the whole country in 2014. The ex-
pansion was implemented by Crown Agents, funded
from a donor pooled fund, managed by UNICEF. It is fo-
cused on rural areas, covering all 60 rural districts and
two urban districts [20], with the cities of Harare and
Bulawayo excluded. Until 2018, district hospitals were
also excluded from the RBF programme in the 42 Crown
Agent districts, though contracts have been signed in
2018 for certain MCH referral indicators to be paid at
district hospital level in all RBF areas.
The aim was for RBF to operate within existing na-
tional structures, however, due to lack of trust between
development partners and government, and arrears
which were outstanding from the Government of
Zimbabwe to the international institutions, funding of
RBF had to be channelled through international organi-
sations [12], which provided the fund-holding, contract-
ing, verification and technical support roles. In relation
to verification, in the Cordaid programme, the local field
officer originally provided the first-line verification,
followed by external checks by the University of
Zimbabwe until late 2017. The community sisters (based
at the district) are now responsible for monthly verifica-
tion in both schemes, though many report logistical
challenges to conduct these as regularly as expected
[16]. Counter-verification is conducted by the imple-
menting agency Health Field Officers, who also conduct
quarterly exit interviews to assess community
satisfaction (in the Crown Agent districts).
Community-based organisations are contracted to
undertake these in Cordaid districts, to maintain more
separation of functions.
District Health Executives undertake quarterly quality
checks, using an integrated checklist, and RBF has
provided resources to support supervision at provin-
cial and district levels. The Provincial Health Execu-
tives are paid against four indicators, which focus on
administrative tasks in relation to the RBF
programme. District Health Executives have 12, which
are a mix of performance-related and administrative
[20]. RBF is also embedded in wider national institu-
tions. The district-level RBF steering committees are
meant to meet quarterly and to report to the District
Development Committees [20], but vary in their level
of engagement.
In 2017–18 a process of institutionalisation began,
whereby these purchasing functions started to be trans-
ferred to a semi-independent project implementation
unit (PIU) in the MoHCC for the 18 World Bank/Cor-
daid districts. During the initial period, staff will be
transferred from Cordaid, to retain their expertise, and
posts will be externally financed. Meanwhile, the Minis-
try of Finance commitment to RBF has increased,
although the financial sustainability of the programme
remains uncertain [12].
Uganda
In Uganda, the RBF schemes that were assessed Included
Saving Mothers, Giving Lives (SMGL) (2012–2017),
NuHealth (2011–2016), and Strengthening Decentralisa-
tion for Sustainability (SDS) (2011–2017). These schemes
were set up with funding from the World Bank, DFID and
USAID respectively and covered selected districts, with a
focus on Western and Northern Uganda. Project imple-
mentation units acted as fund holders, which made pay-
ments for outputs to private not-for-profit (PNFP)
facilities. The performance verification functions were out-
sourced to separate entities – mostly international com-
panies such as Price Waterhouse Coopers, Health
Partners International and Montrose. The verification
agencies worked with local NGOs and local governments
in this function [15].
Most pilots have been implemented in the private
sector, particularly PNFP/mission facilities, with the pub-
lic sector facilities being considered only in the recent
past. In terms of service packages, most schemes focused
on maternal and child health care services,
immunization and outpatient care services, a selective
benefit package within the Uganda minimum health
care package [21, 22]. A few schemes supported dis-
trict local governments to undertake supervision,
planning and management related tasks as the basis
Witter et al. Global Health Research and Policy             (2019) 4:3 Page 6 of 20
for payment of these units. Over time, more support
is being provided to local government and central
government to support integration of RBF at national
and district level [23]. A national RBF framework has
been developed to customise RBF functions to
national and district levels in accordance with the
decentralisation policy of health services in Uganda.
Many functions that were previously undertaken by
international and local NGOs have recently been inte-
grated within MOH and District Health Management
Teams [24]. Currently, RBF schemes are being scaled
up using World Bank grants to 78 districts of Uganda
over the next five years [23]. The current RBF
schemes (i.e. World Bank roll out and BTC3) are
working with both PNFP and public sectors, as op-
posed to the previous ones, which only focused on
the PNFP sector [23, 25].
Effects on key strategic purchasing actions
In the following sections, we review the effects of RBF
on the key strategic purchasing actions identified in our
analytic framework. A summary of the key findings is
provided in Table 3 below.
Effects on key strategic purchasing actions by
government
Establish clear frameworks for purchasers and providers
In contrast with the other two settings, in DRC there is
very weak regulatory capacity of the state at all levels
(central, provincial and zonal). The introduction of RBF
brought the establishment of contracts between pur-
chasers and providers, which provided clearer rules and
regulations for the providers. Additionally, contracts
were also signed between different levels of the MoH
hierarchy. However, these frameworks and regulations
(as established in the contracts) refer to the RBF funding
only and do not apply to other funds.
In Zimbabwe, the regulatory frameworks existed prior
to RBF, but were resource-starved and operated within
an integrated hierarchy – for example, Results-Based
Management (RBM) was introduced in 2005 across the
public sector but was never fully operationalized. Under
RBM, performance contracts are established at each
level, however, the resources to accompany the targets
did not materialise [16]. With RBF, contracts were
signed by the implementing agencies with provincial,
district and RHC levels, establishing roles and payment
systems, but the difference was the availability of funds
to support the realisation of these contracts. As with
DRC, the RBF purchasing body remained external, at
least to date, and covered a sub-set of services, and was
focused at the primary level.
In Uganda, as with Zimbabwe, there was an extensive
planning and regulatory environment, which RBF has
not changed radically. RBF worked within the existing
system and focused on a sub-set of services and
activities. Some RBF schemes set up their own parallel
institutions (fund holder, auditors/verification agents,
and implementing agencies). In the newer schemes, such
as BTC one and World Bank roll out, there has been
more explicit effort to work with the Ministry of Health
and district health teams and leaders [23, 25].
Ensure accountability of purchasers
In DRC, accountability mechanisms are generally very
weak or non-existent. The creation and use of EUPs as
purchasing agencies appears to ensure accountability
and strong links with the MoH (for example, compared
to the use of an external NGO or implementing agency)
since there is a clear ‘delegation of public functions’
from the MoH to the EUP. However, in practice, some
key informants noted that the government did not exer-
cise actively its oversight function under the FED
programme, and this was left to the implementing
agency (AEDES) and its technical assistants. This may
improve under the PDSS since the national RBF unit
embedded within the MoH is in charge of overseeing
and supporting the EUPs. In general however, the EUPs
remain parallel structures and their establishment does
not affect the broader, pre-existing systems of account-
ability (e.g. accountability between levels of health
authorities, or accountability of other purchasers, such
as NGOs supporting services at local level, but not
involved in RBF).
In Zimbabwe, RBF has also established parallel systems
for purchasing RBF indicators, and the accountability of
the purchasers is to funders as much as to the govern-
ment. Moreover, the bulk of purchasing in the wider
public sector remains largely unaffected by RBF. The
large proportion of public resources continue to be
spent on staffing and a number of the health system pil-
lars have their own purchasing arrangements (e.g. for
staff and for pharmaceuticals), rendering public purchas-
ing underpowered and fragmented. However, this has
not been altered by RBF. The bulk of aid funds are man-
aged by a few organisations, such as UNICEF and
UNDP. There is a national steering committee which co-
ordinates between pooled fund donors (previously a lar-
ger list but now including DFID, the European Union,
SIDA and Irish Aid) and the Ministry of Health, how-
ever, these pooled funds are now a small proportion
(7%) of the overall aid funding to the health sector [17].
In Uganda, RBF has been operating in parallel to and
has not yet impacted on the wider accountability of pur-
chasers, though this may change if funding is brought
back from NGOs into payments through a unit in the
MoH, as planned under the World Bank programme.
More generally, the sector-wide approach created
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Table 3 Summary of key findings
DRC Zimbabwe Uganda
Key strategic
purchasing
actions by
government
Establish clear
frameworks for
purchaser(s) and
providers
- Weak regulatory capacity
- RBF contracts provided clearer
rules and regulations, though re.
RBF funding only
- Strong regulatory frameworks
(e.g., Results Based
Management since 2005), but
resource-starved.
- Only primary level and some
indicators covered
- RBF did not radically change
regulatory frameworks
- Some changes only for
providers/services covered by
RBF
Ensure accountability of
purchaser(s)
- EUPs have stronger
accountability links with MoH
compared to NGO projects
- In practice, government/MOH
did not exercise their oversight
role
- Parallel system with external
purchasers
- Accountability of purchasers to
funders as well as to
government
- Non-RBF funding through dif-
ferent channels
- RBF operating in parallel
- Plans for a national scheme
under MoH leadership is being
used in the current RBF model.
Ensure adequate
resources mobilised
- Out of pocket payments main
source of funding
- RBF mobilised additional
resources to decrease user fees
- Limited success of EUPs in
raising/pooling funds
- RBF provided modest but
partially additional funds, still
significant for primary care
providers
- Focus on MCH indicators
- Donor dependent
- RBF donor funded, with donors
working in silos even within the
same region
- Discussions of a virtual pool but
not realised yet
Fill service delivery
infrastructure gaps
- Assessments carried out by RBF
projects and bonus provided in
some cases
- RBF provided some upfront
investment, but no major
revision of infrastructure
planning in relation to needs
- District teams remain
responsible for identifying
service delivery infrastructure
gaps
Key strategic
purchasing
actions in
relation to
citizens/
population
served
Assess needs,
preferences, values of
the population to
specify benefits
- Norms on activity packages
existed and RBF worked within
them, covering some services in
the packages
- EUPs allowed to revise RBF
package – but rarely done in
practice
- No consultations on needs,
values and preferences
- Package defined nationally with
no scope for variation at local
level
- No direct consultation with
communities
- Needs determined using routine
data and national surveys and
indicators
- RBF includes services from the
minimum package
Inform the population
of entitlements
Establish mechanisms
for complaints and
feedback
Publicly report on use
of resources and
performance
- RBF requires price list to be
made public on the facility wall
- RBF aimed at improving
community participation by
strengthening Health
Management Committees
- Community verification, but
delays in data collection and
no/little analysis and feedback
- IT portal to report performance,
but only for RBF indicators and
no community verification
scores
- RBF requires price list to be
made public on the facility wall
- RBF helped revive Health
Centre Committees: variable
results and capacity
- Pre-existing mechanisms for
feedback (barazas, suggestion
boxes, Health Unit Management
Committees)
- Client satisfaction surveys in
some RBF programmes
Key strategic
purchasing
actions in
relation to
providers
Select (accredit)
providers
- Done by health authorities/
regulator, EUPs have limited
power in deciding which
facilities to contract (limited to
type of contract or sub-
contracts) and to enforce
sanctions
- RBF did not change existing
accreditation system
- RBF required facilities to meet
minimum criteria, including
developing an operational plan,
having a bank account and a
functioning HCC
- Accreditation bodies preexisted
and RBF did not change this.
- A few schemes have provided
start-up capital to enable more
providers to get accreditation
requirements.
Establish service
agreements/contracts
- RBF introduced contracts – but
rarely enforceable with limited
room for sanctions
- Contracting done by EUPs, and
limited to RBF services/facilities
- RBF introduced contracts – but
rarely enforceable with limited
room for sanctions
- Contracts are limited to services
and facilities covered by RBF
(As in Zimbabwe)
Design, implement,
modify provider
payment methods to
encourage efficiency
and quality
- Very little public funding other
than (some) salaries
- RBF provided additional
performance-based funding, but
did not alter public/other do-
nors’ funding
- Some evidence of quality
improvements
- Mixed picture in terms of
outputs and quality
improvements
- Focus on MCH services,
including some for which
coverage is high
- Some quality improvements
(e.g., drugs availability)
- Little quality improvements
given broader structural
challenges such as workforce
shortages and insufficient
medicines distributed from the
center.
- Private facilities have more
flexibility to improve service
inputs.
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structures between government, donors and civil society
to improve accountability [26]. Furthermore, the Minis-
try of Finance has gradually implemented an Integrated
Financial Management system in order to improve ac-
countability within government ministries and local gov-
ernments [27].
Ensure adequate resources to meet service entitlements
Patients are the main source of health financing in the
DRC - 40% of total health expenditure, based on 2015
national health accounts, compared to 37% from donors
and 17% from government - [28] - and are expected to
pay for all the services they use, except a few preventa-
tive services vertically funded and in areas and times of
acute crisis (for services provided or supported by
NGOs). Usually, donors and NGOs decide which ser-
vices to provide for free, where and to whom and mobil-
ise funds for it. The MoH plays a little role for the
coordination of resource mobilization at central level
(for large donors) or at local level (for smaller donors
and NGOs).
RBF has mobilized additional resources from inter-
national donors interested in funding service delivery
through this mechanism (with a budget of $1.5 per
capita for the FED programme [19] and slightly less than
$3.70 for the PDSS, in its early phases – personal com-
munication). The vision under both RBF programmes
was that the EUPs would play a stronger role in
mobilizing even further resources from other donors,
but also from government, by providing a trusted
semi-autonomous body which could meet the fidu-
ciary concerns of donors. EUPs were envisaged to
become a basket funding mechanism (to pool, but
also to mobilise funding) at provincial level. With
time, EUPs might also work as strategic purchaser
and fund-holder for funds from mutuelles and social
health insurance. However, in reality this has not hap-
pened in the way envisaged. Under the FED
programme, only UNICEF decided to use the EUPs to
pool and channel funds for their water and sanitation
(WASH) projects, but this remained in parallel to
health sector funding from the EU. Under the PDSS
programme, there is more participation from a
Table 3 Summary of key findings (Continued)
DRC Zimbabwe Uganda
Establish provider
payment rates
Pay providers regularly
- RBF introduced payment rates
for services (not the practice
before)
- Rates are additional to user fees
- Rates defined at provincial level,
depending on funds available
and donors’ preferences (FED)
- Rates defined centrally and
included in Project Manual
(PDSS)
- Delays in paying providers
- RBF introduced payment rates
for services (not the practice
before)
- Rates defined centrally, focus
on MCH and low coverage
indicators
- Concerns over sustainability of
payments (rates have been
reduced over time)
- RBF introduced payment rates
for services (not the practice
before)
- Payment methods complex and
not well understood
- Different schemes have different
indicators and rates, depending
on funders‘preferences and
budget
- Frequent unilateral decisions by
fund-holders, often poorly com-
municated to provider and local
governments
Allocate resources
equitably
Strategies to promote
equitable access
Monitor user payment
policies
- Bonus to compensate remote
facilities
- Extra funds to cover services
provided to the very poor
(Equity Funds), but only
for hospital services (FED) and
for few services (PDSS)
- Support to reduce user fees and
introduce flat fees to cross-
subsidise between patients
- Community verification to
monitor user fee payments
- Remoteness bonus, but
considered too small and failed
to compensate facilities with
small catchment areas
- RBF aimed to remove user fees
for the services it covered.
However, no difference in out
of pocket payments between
control/intervention areas (in
impact evaluation)
- No bonus in payment
calculation but some initial
bonus to remote facilities.
- Facilities/districts often chosen
as easier to work with, adding
to the fragmentation and
inequity
- Reduction of user fees (in PNFP
facilities) as a precondition for
RBF support
Develop, manage and
use information
systems to monitor/
audit performance and
protect against fraud
Supervise providers
- RBF information system is
parallel to HMIS. Plans to ensure
integration in the future
- Zonal/Provincial teams
contracted to ensure supervision
- RBF used HMIS data after
having verified and corrected it
- Providers have multiple data
reporting requirements
- RBF brought greater focus on
data quality
- Little evidence of false claim,
risk based verification
- Pre-existing well developed and
integrated supervision system
to which RBF provided funding
- Similar issues of multiple data
streams, but HMIS remains main
one
- Supervision system only partially
affected/funded by RBF
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number of donors (World Bank, Global Fund, GAVI,
USAID, UNICEF, UNFPA) but this is negotiated
between donors in Kinshasa or internationally, rather
than at EUP level. The plan for the integration of
mutuelles has been discussed in North Kivu (one of
the better-working EUPs), but never really took off.
Discussions to include funds from the provincial
government in North Kivu have not yet borne fruit.
For Zimbabwe, RBF provided modest but partially
additional funds: the original RBF scheme was budgeted
at $2 per capita [29] and a recent study estimated RBF’s
incremental cost at $3.19 per capita [30]. This is small in
the overall scale of expenditure – public health expend-
iture, including aid but excluding out of pocket pay-
ments – is estimated at $69 per capita [17] – but still
significant as a revenue source at primary facility level.
As in DRC, there was an aspiration to mobilise other
funders to pool revenues with RBF funds, However, that
has not happened as yet. RBF remains focused on mater-
nal health indicators in particular, and is not able to
support other major population groups, such as chronic
patients, those with communicable or non-
communicable diseases, or important population health
priorities, such as nutrition, environmental health or
mental health [16]. RBF funds are subject to annual
commitments by donors which have reduced over the
years and become more insecure. Given the on-going
economic and fiscal challenges in Zimbabwe, resource
mobilisation remains inadequate; household payments
accounted for around 25% of total health expenditures
in 2015, of which 95% were out of pocket [31].
In Uganda, the Ministry of Health is responsible for
the core functions of resource mobilisation as well as
policymaking, standards formulation and quality assur-
ance [32]. The major funding sources for health are out
of pocket expenditure (50% of the total), off-budget/
on-budget donor contributions (35%) and government
(15%) [33]. The health sector has remained inadequately
and irregularly funded [34]. Donors, who have been
working in silos, even in the same region, have funded
the majority of the RBF schemes - for example, DFID
funded Nuhealth, while USAID funded the SDS scheme
in Northern Uganda. Per capita expenditure for each
scheme is not reported. As in Zimbabwe, there has been
talk about creating a virtual pool through RBF, to bring
donor funds together, however, there is no evidence of
this happening to date.
Fill service delivery gaps
In DRC, national standards exist for infrastructure (e.g.
facilities per inhabitant), staffing and equipment [35].
However, many of these standards remain theoretical be-
cause of lack of resources [36]. In order to address infra-
structure gaps, both RBF programmes carried out initial
assessments to make sure basic equipment, infrastruc-
ture (and possibly staff – but without being able to influ-
ence the hiring of health workers) was in place. The
PDSS also provides cash payments (unités d’investisse-
ment) to facilities to cover their investment needs as
detailed in the facilities’ business plans [18].
In Zimbabwe, RBF provided some upfront investment
for primary care facilities and also supports on-going
repairs and upgrading through facility reinvestment of
funds. However, the programme has not led to any revi-
sion of infrastructure planning in relation to population
needs [17], as it is a system in which funds flow accord-
ing to utilisation, which largely reflects catchment popu-
lations [37], rather than following an assessment of how
best (most equitably and efficiently) to meet population
health needs.
In Uganda, as in Zimbabwe, district health teams are
mainly responsible for supervision and identifying
service delivery gaps. This system was unchanged by the
RBF programmes, but some of the RBF projects (such as
NuHealth, BTC, and SMGL) conducted facility assess-
ments at their start and in most case provided seed
grants to improve functionality before enrolment into
the schemes.
Key strategic purchasing actions in relation to population
served
Assessing service needs, preferences and values of the
population and using them to specify service entitlements
Across the three countries, RBF worked within defined
national entitlements and did not involve new consult-
ation around care packages or specification of needs. In
DRC, there are national level norms for services to be
covered within the ‘minimum package of activities’
(PMA) for health centres and in the ‘complementary
package of activities’ (PCA) for hospitals. Aside from
these, there are no national-level, specific standards of
care or clinical guidelines in the country [38]. The RBF
programmes have adapted to this and both schemes
covered most of the services included in the PMA/PCA.
The PDSS Operational Manual suggests that these could
be modified “if the regulators (health authorities) con-
sider other services as a local public health priority” [18]:
p.51). However, this has not been done in practice and it
is not clear who would propose and have a final decision
on this – whether it would be the EUPs (as strategic
purchaser), the Provincial Division of Health (DPS) or
the central level (Cellule Technique FBR), according to
key informants.
Equally, in Zimbabwe, there has been no consultation
linked to RBF on users’ needs or preferences to feed into
the benefits package, as this is agreed nationally and
there is no scope for variation at local level. Similarly, in
Uganda, there was no structured process for
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consultation with communities in relation to selection of
services, as the majority of the RBF schemes derived
their service package from the minimum health care
package [22].
Informing the population of their entitlements
Some efforts to strengthen community information and
participation are typically made under the RBF pro-
grammes. For example, in DRC the PDSS requires that
the price list for users is made public on the wall of the
facility and known by the community [18]. This is also
the case in Zimbabwe.
Additionally, in DRC RBF programmes aimed at im-
proving community participation by strengthening the
role of the Comités de Gestion de Santé/Comité de Dir-
ection (the latter is the hospital level one) and Comité de
Développement de la Santé. For example, under the
PDSS programme, these bodies are involved in the prep-
aration of the business plans (or management plans) of
the facility, they participate in the decision over the fees
to be applied to each service and the organisation
of regular meetings with the health committees is one of
the score criteria in the quality check list. In Zimbabwe,
RBF has helped to revive Health Centre Committees
and has shifted their role from fund-raising to rev-
enue allocation. However, studies highlight many chal-
lenges in relation to their role of connecting with and
raising awareness amongst communities and also their
variable capacity [39, 40].
Both RBF programmes in DRC introduced ‘community
verification’, which is carried out by local associations.
These associations are contracted by the EUPs, who are
also in charge of organising the community verification
(for example, by providing the sample of patients to be
visited). Community verification is aimed at checking
the real existence of patients indicated in the facilities’
registries, but also to assess their satisfaction, services
received and fees paid. This information is fed back to
the EUP but, again, echoing findings in Zimbabwe, there
have been delays in the collection and analysis of data
from the communities [19] and it is not clear how far
the information is shared back with communities or
what is done at facility level to respond to low scores or
complaints. In summary, for both DRC and Zimbabwe,
how effective design elements, such as community verifi-
cation and strengthening of health committees, are in
strengthening the link with the population and ensuring
their awareness and access to entitlements is not clear,
as also confirmed in other studies [10, 41].
Under the PDSS programme, there is a publicly avail-
able IT portal4 showing RBF results. However, it only fo-
cuses on RBF indicators and measures and does not
report on community verification scores.
In Zimbabwe, one of the elements enforced by RBF is
grievances boxes in health facilities, which might in-
crease responsiveness, however, studies have found that
there is low use of complaints mechanisms because of
fear, low awareness, and tolerance of facility conditions
[39, 42]. There is a feedback mechanism through client
satisfaction surveys, which account for 20% of the qual-
ity scores in calculating RBF payments. However, results
tend to be high across the board, suggesting a lack of
sensitivity to quality [17], and again, it is not clear how
they feed back into quality improvement.
In Uganda, various mechanisms for receiving feedback
already existed prior to RBF. These included Health Unit
Management Committees, suggestion boxes, ‘Barazas’
(community feedback dialogue meetings), and village
health teams. A patient charter was developed to ensure
that the rights of patients are protected in the course of
seeking health care and that patients can demand their
rights to quality health care [43]. These have not been
optimally used due to inadequate funding.
In some RBF schemes (Cordaid and NuHealth) client
satisfaction surveys were integrated into the design to
capture service users’ perspectives, feeding into quality
bonuses as in Zimbabwe. Health assemblies and regional
meetings were also held to provide learning and infor-
mation sharing opportunities among different stake-
holders Other schemes in Northern Uganda utilised
media such as local FM stations and meetings with
various stakeholders to share information with the
local community and beyond. It is not clear how
often and to what extent the feedback is acted upon
but in some cases key informants indicated that im-
provements were made.
There were already national guidelines on public
reporting of expenditures by budget line at facility level
in Uganda [44], which RBF also mandated (Cordaid,
NUHealth, BTC). Health facilities are also required to
publicise (pin on their noticeboard) their performance in
relation to services such as immunisation. RBF did
not change this, rather it added extra indicators that
facilities needed to display. Some of the schemes were
reported to have done random selections of mothers
to conduct exit interviews with them during the
supervision visits. Other facilities selected ‘ward
leaders’ among patients to provide feedback on behalf
of patients.
Key strategic purchasing actions in relation to providers
Selecting or accrediting providers
In DRC, selection of providers is done by the regulator
(the health authority) at the time when they prepare the
carte sanitaire (mapping of all the health facilities in an
area). At that stage, the health authorities decide which
facility is the reference facility for the area based on the
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population size. RBF did not bring substantial change to
this. Accreditation and selection are still done by the
health authority based on national Normes sanitaires
and the local carte sanitaire. EUPs have limited power in
deciding which facilities to include in the contract,
according to key informants, and therefore also to en-
force the potential sanction of not contracting an
under-performing or gaming facility. The only decision
EUPs had under the FED project was in terms of decid-
ing which type of contract to offer to facilities (intégra-
tion or progression,) based on their infrastructure and
equipment levels. Initially, facilities with an integration
contract would receive payment only for curative con-
sultations provided and were paid with drugs (rather
than cash) [45].
Under the PDSS programme, there are some on-going
discussions on sub-contracting of facilities (for example,
private facilities within the catchment area of an ‘official’
facility, which may be sub-contracted by the latter to
carry out some services). In theory, the selection of
sub-contracted facilities would be agreed on by the EUP.
In Zimbabwe, the accreditation system for facilities
already existed prior to RBF and has not been changed
by it. All public and mission facilities were accepted
within RBF as long as they met the minimum managerial
criteria, such as development of operational plans, hav-
ing a functional HCC, having a bank account, and
agreeing to remove user fees for mother and child
health care [16].
Equally, in Uganda, prior systems for accreditation by
the Ministry of Health and PNFP bodies, such as
Uganda Catholic Medical Bureau, Uganda Protestant
Medical Bureau, Uganda Muslim Medical Bureau, and
Uganda Orthodox Medical Bureau, as well as annual li-
cencing from the Medical Councils existed. RBF intro-
duction additional quality criteria, which were used to
incentivise and fund quality improvements, though fo-
cused on the PNFP sector in Uganda.
Establishing service agreements
Across the three settings, RBF introduced contracts at
the facility level, which had previously not been in exist-
ence. For example, in DRC, under both RBF pro-
grammes, contracting is carried out by the EUPs. EUPs
sign contracts with the districts and with health facilities,
detailing indicators, tariffs, verification procedures and
any other rules and tasks (e.g., preparation of business
plans). The contracts are limited to the services covered
by RBF and there is no evidence of this contractual ap-
proach having extended to other sectors (e.g. local gov-
ernment and the private sector) as yet. This is equally
the case in Zimbabwe and Uganda.
In all contexts, these contracts are not enforceable and
there is limited space for sanctions, or for negotiating
contracts or excluding providers. So ‘contracting’ is ra-
ther weak. Providers sign the contract to get funds but
without thinking too much about the details, according
to key informants. It is also unclear how far the RBF
contracts are permanently modifying behaviour – for
example, the training on business plan development pro-
vides useful skills at facility level, but the plans are often
not followed for lack of funds and it is unclear if pro-
viders would continue with these plans if not required to
do so under RBF.
In these settings, formularies and standard treatment
guidelines are provided by the Ministry of Health at cen-
tral level, and RBF has not introduced any reforms. RBF
programmes worked within the existing guidelines and
standards: the list of indicators contracted and the qual-
ity checklist provided some reinforcement of national
standards/guidelines by linking payment to criteria based
on them.
Designing, implementing and modifying provider payment
methods to encourage efficiency and service quality
In DRC, there has typically been underfunding or no
funding at all for facilities or primary health care
from the public budget. In addition, not all staff
receives salaries: according to a public expenditure
review, only 32% of the health workforce is included
on payroll [36]. RBF has provided additional funds
based on outputs, but focused on a limited set of in-
dicators, and has not altered payment systems from
government and other donors. In terms of its impact
on quality and efficiency, there is little evidence.
Under the FED project, while there was some
improvement to equipment and infrastructure avail-
ability (structural quality) especially at hospital level,
also thanks to the non-performance based compo-
nent of the project, the impact on quality of services
was negligible. This may be related to the fact that
the project did not initially include quality indicators
in the bonus calculations [19].
In Zimbabwe, the impact evaluation suggests a mixed
picture in terms of gains in outputs and quality resulting
from RBF [42]. The payments focus provider attention
on maternal and child health services, however, many of
the indicators are already high, in terms of coverage, so
it is not clear how far the incentives are likely to be effi-
cient (e.g. for antenatal care) [16]. RBF has certainly
helped to reinforce national quality standards and has
funded some quality improvements at facility level, such
as filling gaps in drug supply. However, this is not neces-
sarily the most efficient means to do that (local procure-
ment costs being higher than national ones) [17].
In Uganda, there was some confusion at local level
about payment methods and formulae, which were seen
as complicated and unclear, as well as about the complex
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verification, involving expensive audit firms (who lacked
medical expertise) [46]. The need to simplify, harmonise
and reduce the cost of RBF programmes was raised. Key
informants felt that implementers had developed
payment systems alone, without consulting facility
in-charges or PNFP representatives, and they did not
understand how rates had been calculated or whether
they reflected actual costs. In addition, key informants
highlighted that it was hard for RBF to improve quality
alone, given structural issues (procurement rules, wider
funding issues, human resource allocation etc.).
Establish provider payment rates
In all three countries, RBF introduced specific payments
for services, which was not the practice before (public
services being financed through input-based budgets,
generally inadequate). However, the way in which RBF
indicators were set varied. For example, in DRC, under
the FED programme, the choice of services and payment
level was done by the CPP (provincial steering commit-
tee – therefore with some flexibility at provincial level),
based on the budget available and preferences of the
project funder, who approved the indicators, according
to key informants. By contrast, under the PDSS
programme, indicators included in the contracts are de-
fined by the operational manual. Choices are said to be
based on public health priorities and budget available.
Also, the PDSS is focused on maternal and child health
so most of the indicators cover those services. In theory,
adaptations at provincial level are possible, but in prac-
tice they have not happened yet and all provinces follow
what established in the operational manual.
In terms of tariffs, in both DRC's RBF programmes these
represented an additional amount to (very low) existing
funding [36]. Under the FED programme, tariffs were re-
lated to the real costs of service provision, while under the
PDSS they are much lower, and aim to provide an incen-
tive to lower user fees and increase coverage.
The RBF programmes are also facing challenges to en-
sure timely payments. For the FED programmes, there
were delays in payment of up to three months [19]. The
PDSS only started recently so information on payment
delays is not yet available.
As with the PDSS programme in DRC, in Zimbabwe
indicators were drawn up based on priorities and lagging
indicators, focussed on RMNCH, as this was the focus
for the funders. The payment is based on budgets and
weightings across service levels, and provides marginal
(not fully costed) payments to underfunded public facil-
ities [16]. Indicators and rates are nationally established
[20] and have been adjusted a few times, with the recent
addition of some wider indicators for tuberculosis and
HIV, though with very low payments which are unlikely
to influence provider behaviour.
The initial assumption was that government would
continue to provide base funding but that has not been
realised, leaving primary facilities dependent on the RBF
payments and hospitals under-funded [17]. This is caus-
ing concern, especially given the recent reductions in
(and insecurity of) the RBF budgets, which have also
caused delays in payments to facilities of three to six
months.
In Uganda, the different schemes have had different
indicators and payments, depending on the funder’s
budget and area of interest. These could change and
facilities be removed from the scheme based on unilat-
eral decisions, often poorly communicated. Both govern-
ment funds (for drugs and activities such as outreach)
and RBF funds have been delayed by three or more
months.
Allocating resources equitably across areas
The starting point in DRC was the absence of a resource
allocation formula – or even resources – flowing to
health facilities. RBF flows follow utilisation, not
area-based needs assessment, but both RBF programmes
incorporate a bonus element to compensate remote fa-
cilities. Under the PDSS, the bonus ranges between 0
and 40% based on the category of the facility, defined by
its geographical accessibility (there are five categories
from 1 for the most accessible ones to 5 for the
remotest) [18].
Under both RBF programmes, extra funds are pro-
vided to facilities to cover the full costs of providing ser-
vices to the very poor (indigents). Under the FED
project, the mechanism was named Fonds d’Equité
(equity funds) and was operated by external actors
(NGOs, rather than EUPs), starting from 2008. The
Fonds d’Equité only covered services at hospital level
[45]. Under the PDSS, an increased tariff is paid to allow
facilities to provide free services for the very poor, for a
maximum of 5% of the population. However, the
increase in tariff paid only affects one service at health
centre level (curative visits) and three services at hospital
level (days in hospital, major surgery, minor surgery).
The very poor are pre-identified by the health commit-
tees, and lists are made available to the facilities [18].
Additionally, both RBF projects aimed to support facil-
ities to lower user fees and/or introduce “flat fees”
(which is also done by non RBF projects in DRC - [47]),
thus cross-subsidising between more and less intensive
patients. As there is no national regulation of user pay-
ment policies, fees are set by the facilities, in theory in
collaboration with the health committee and the com-
munity. Both RBF projects aimed to better enforcing fees
being defined in agreement with communities, publicly
available and respected. They also aimed to reduce costs
for the patients – at least for the services covered by
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RBF. Community verification surveys introduced under
the RBF programmes include questions on fees paid by
users. However, it is not clear what action is taken if fees
are not respected. Overall, an internal evaluation of the
FED found that fees were substantially lower thanks to
the performance-based payments received by the facil-
ities, but also the in-kind drug support. As a conse-
quence, utilisation rates generally increased [19].
Zimbabwe also lacks a resource allocation formula,
and budget allocations have followed historic patterns
and planned activities [48]. While infrastructure is dis-
tributed relatively equitably in Zimbabwe, staffing is less
so, especially for doctors [49]. The RBF programme pro-
vides some start-up funds and a remoteness bonus, but
it is small and has failed to compensate for the small
catchment populations which more remote facilities typ-
ically have [37]. Given the small payments per indicator,
reaching the hard-to-reach populations is not well
incentivised [17]. However, the RBF package is equitable
in terms of its focus on essential services and primary
level delivery, as well as its focus on enabling removal of
user fees for MCH services [16].
RBF provided resources to support and reinforce a
public policy of free services at primary level. However,
some fees are still charged and the RBF evaluation did
not find a difference in out of pocket payments between
control and intervention areas [42].
Uganda has a capital development fund assigned to
districts that are more disadvantaged, as well as a for-
mula for allocating public funds that takes into con-
sideration needs and populations [50]. However,
resources such as staff are not equitably allocated and
as with the other two countries, these major re-
sources are not directly affected by RBF. RBF (BTC)
provided some infrastructure investment for facilities
that did not meet standards and early programmes
such as NUHealth focused on post-conflict areas with
higher needs. However, the majority of programmes,
as highlighted, worked only with the private and
PNFP sectors, and the selection of sites was often
pragmatic, based on districts which were likely to be
easier to work with. This has added to fragmentation
across the system.
In relation to user fees, as with the other countries, re-
duction of fees was a precondition of most RBF schemes,
especially those in the non-public sector. However, if
RBF payments are low, it is difficult for facilities to re-
duce fees or stop charging [46]. Moreover, managing ef-
fective lowering of user fees will be more difficult if the
pilots are extended to a larger area. In the case of the
NuHealth scheme, although user fees were reduced in
both areas, the majority of facilities in the intervention
area continued to charge. Health care costs decreased in
both Acholi and Lango [46].
Developing, managing and using information systems
In DRC, RBF operates a parallel information system to
the national HMIS, which is considered to be weak.
While HMIS data are entered by ECZ (health zone) staff
based on facility reports, in the FED programme, the in-
formation system was based on verified data and man-
aged at provincial level by the EUPs and the PDSS
operates a centralised RBF Portal for the verified data.
There are plans to ensure integration of HMIS/DHIS2
and OpenRBF, starting in end of 2018/early 2019, ac-
cording to one key informant. While the implementation
of the PDSS is too recent to be assessed, under the FED
there were reported instances of mistakes and frauds by
the facilities, which were introduced not only in the in-
voices but also in the facility’s registries and therefore
also affected the HMIS system [19].
In terms of wider supervision, under the PDSS, zonal
teams are also included in RBF and contracted by the
EUPs to carry out a list of activities. These include
monthly supervision to all facilities in their area [18]. In
the FED programme, zonal teams had non-performance
based funding from the central level only (not the RBF
project) [19, 45].
In Zimbabwe, the RBF programme uses HMIS data,
but having verified and corrected it, does not feed the
data back into the HMIS (thus limiting its contribution
to strengthening it) [16]. In general, in Zimbabwe, as in
many settings, providers suffer from multiple data
reporting requirements, registers, and surveys, and RBF
has not eased the situation. Although it works from
existing registers, by placing emphasis on exact record-
ing – with sanctions for omissions, in the form of lost
revenue – it adds to staff burdens and stress. The posi-
tive effect, however, is a greater focus on data quality.
There is little evidence of false claims, so risk-based veri-
fication has been introduced. For procurement, public
financial management procedures are very complex,
making use of RBF funds time-consuming at facility
level.
Zimbabwe had a well-developed and integrated super-
vision system prior to RBF, however, this was lacking re-
sources after the economic crisis of the 2000s. RBF has
provided funding to provincial and district teams which,
though linked to RBF indicators, allows for wider super-
vision activities [16].
In Uganda, a similar issue of multiple data streams
arises, although the HMIS is the main system for collect-
ing data for health service delivery [32]. As in
Zimbabwe, RBF programmes largely work within exist-
ing systems, and have both put additional demands on
staff but also facilitated local improvements through
providing funds for, for example, hiring more staff to
help with data management. On the other hand, RBF
auditors are not very skilled or trained, especially on
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clinical issues and data validators have also been on a
learning curve.
District teams are also included in RBF in Uganda, and
structural issues, like staffing capacity for supervision,
are included in the performance indicators for districts
in the NUHealth and SDS schemes (although it is diffi-
cult for the districts to act on them).
For the scaled-up model, there is still discussion of
whether quarterly audits will be done by internal organi-
sations or by an external one. As some perceived it, po-
tential issues with fraud are overplayed in order to push
for external agencies. It is likely that larger hospitals are
at higher risk of fraud, compared to smaller units.
Discussion
This article is an important addition to the literature, as
it examines empirically – and for the first time, to our
knowledge, in low income and fragile contexts - what
the impact of RBF is on strategic purchasing in a health
system as a whole. Strategic purchasing has been defined
in many ways, but there is a consensus on some of its
core features, and we use a detailed framework [8] to
enable a structured examination. The three case studies
present different contexts but many of the RBF design
features are shared, leading to similarities of conclusion,
as well as differences (summarised in Table 3).
Overall, the hypothesis that RBF would bring about
widespread transformation of institutional relationships
in the health financing and strategic purchasing architec-
ture and be a catalyst for comprehensive health system
reforms [5, 6] is not fully supported, although there are
important gains in specific areas and subsets of services.
At the government level, we find little change to the ac-
countability of purchasers in these case studies, but RBF
does mobilise additional resources to support entitle-
ments. In relation to the population, RBF appears to
bring in improvements in specifying and informing
about entitlements for some services. However, the en-
gagement and consultation with the population on their
needs was found to be limited. In relation to providers,
RBF did not impact in any major way on provider ac-
creditation and selection, or on treatment guidelines
(which has mixed implications – on the one hand, this
may limit its power to raise standards, however set
against that is the positive reading of that RBF was
working in an integrated fashion within the existing
health systems). However, it is important to note that
RBF did introduce some critical changes in important
areas of the purchasing systems. These include, a more
contractual relationship for some providers and (at least
partial) improvements in provider payment systems,
moving away from (historical) budget or no funding at
all towards output-oriented allocations, increasing the
focus on data quality, increased financial management
autonomy for primary providers and enforcing equitable
strategies.
RBF remains an ‘add-on’ payment method [51] and
cannot change all elements of strategic purchasing in-
cluded in the analytic framework. It is also argued that
RBF can have important effects in introducing change in
strategic purchasing arrangements, for example in terms
of output, quality and data focus, donor harmonisation
and provider autonomy. However, these theoretical re-
flections hinge on the hypothesis that RBF is well de-
signed and implemented, and well integrated in the
health financing arrangements and existing systems [51].
In fact, we find that one of the reasons why RBF pro-
grammes may have had limited impact on overall stra-
tegic purchasing is that they have so far been viewed and
implemented as stand-alone ‘financing mechanisms’ ra-
ther than as part of a mixed provider payment system,
and have been run as pilot projects which are not inte-
grated into the existing systems, including the health fi-
nancing architecture [52]. This has led to a
fragmentation and duplication of strategic purchasing
actions under different programmes and schemes, which
has diminished the potential for systemic change. More-
over, many schemes do not take up key elements and ac-
tions in relation to providers for payment systems, such
as involving providers in their design, including risk ad-
justment and ensuring long term commitment [53]. Al-
though, as some argue, RBF programmes can still
represent a “first exposure” to strategic purchasing in
terms of introducing the use of information in decision
making and providing some financial and managerial au-
tonomy to providers, our article highlights the outstand-
ing challenges of integrating RBF into health systems to
achieve reforms in overall strategic purchasing arrange-
ments. These include aligning with other payment
mechanisms, with wider public financial management
and with verification systems [52], which is particu-
larly challenging in fragile and donor-dependent
contexts.
We also note that some of the key differences across
case studies relate to the nature of the RBF programme,
which may determine the different extent to which RBF
integrates or reforms strategic purchasing arrangements
and the health financing system more generally. For ex-
ample, there are multiple pilots funded by different do-
nors in Uganda and DRC, whereas in Zimbabwe, there
is one national programme. In Uganda, the RBF pro-
grammes have hitherto focused on the PNFP sector,
while in Zimbabwe and DRC, the main recipients are
public sector providers (with a smaller PNFP compo-
nent). Equally, the contextual differences are important
to note and influence the degree of impact of RBF on
strategic purchasing. Zimbabwe and Uganda have stron-
ger government leadership in the sector, compared to
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DRC, and the under-funding of the sector is less
extreme, both of which reduce the innovation space for
RBF, while having other potential advantages, like in-
creasing the likelihood of sustainability and integration,
when buy-in is real [16]. Further, although all three have
experienced recent conflicts and crises, the context is
more stable in Uganda, in particular, but also to some
extent in Zimbabwe, whereas DRC remains instable and
conflict-affected, which tends to detract from longer
term investments. Some of the programmes are young,
though others, like the RBF programme in Zimbabwe,
are operating on a national scale and now looking to-
wards institutionalisation [12]. Clearly these findings
represent a preliminary view of a changing landscape
and more research would be needed in the future to
document further developments.
The contextual differences also mean that recommen-
dations are to be tailored to different settings. In particu-
lar, while institutionalisation and integration seem to be
essential across all contexts to ensure that RBF plays a
more significant role in reforming and strengthening
strategic purchasing arrangements, the degree, speed
and processes of such institutionalisation and integration
should vary between settings, depending on the national
leadership and stewardship capacity. In places where
these are weak, such as the DRC among our cases, do-
nors may need to play a more significant role in terms
of supporting harmonisation processes (also through the
creation of semi-autonomous purchasing entities). It is
important that support for and development of strategic
purchasing takes an overall system approach, with RBF
as one tool amongst many to address systemic
weaknesses.
The experience of the EUPs in the DRC
Our analysis in DRC describes the experience of the
EUPs, as semi-autonomous purchasing agencies, which
represent an original model for the institutional design
of RBF – somewhat similar to a recent proposal for the
creation of Independent Service Authorities (ISAs) for
service delivery in post-conflict, fragile states [54]. They
also resemble the solution adopted in Cameroon where,
after a series of RBF pilots which made use of an exter-
nal agency for the implementation of RBF, the purchas-
ing role was moved to a public organisation. A
pre-existing body, the Regional Fund for Health Promo-
tion was chosen and the purchasing functions trans-
ferred to it in 2014 [55]. These have the legal status of
‘public interest groups’ and are effectively regional dia-
logue structures, consisting of representatives of the
communities, the MoH and public administration and
donors. The inclusive composition of their membership
aims to guarantee their accountability and also their in-
dependence from the government, making the RFHPs
semi-autonomous bodies that can ensure the purchasing
role is managed by a national agency, while maintaining
a separation of function from the MoH [56].
In practice, EUPs are more closely linked to the needs
of the implementation of the RBF programmes and have
a narrow role in relation to purchasing. They do some-
times take up some of the roles related to strategic pur-
chasing, such as verification, reporting, community
feedback, and fund-holding (this last in the case of the
FED EUPs), which are mostly functions which were not
done at all previously. However, their decision-making
power on other key elements related to strategic pur-
chasing is very limited. Most activities remain in the
hands of the government at national or provincial level,
or are decided by the donor (such as regulation, defin-
ition of benefits package and level of tariffs, accredit-
ation, even fund-holding and payment for the PDSS
programme). The original vision of the EUPs becoming
a joint, integrated pooling and purchasing agency at
decentralised level for the entire health system (pooling
revenues from different sources to purchase services)
and also gaining financial and technical independence
from external donors, remains unfulfilled so far. It will
be relevant to conduct further research on their evolu-
tion under the ongoing RBF scheme.
Study limitations
This study drew on interviews whose number was more
limited in some contexts than others, due to availability
and accessibility of respondents. Equally, some of the
documents which describe the process of policy develop-
ment and roll out are confidential or not available, so
while the researchers tried to access as broad a range of
documents as possible, they could not be comprehen-
sive. In particular, in DRC, interviews were carried out
remotely and it was therefore difficult to reach many in-
formants and in particular national actors. As a conse-
quence, there is a clear predominance of international
actors. Additionally, the PDSS programme is relatively
recent and most of our documents and discussion with
the informants are bound to refer only to its design and
(very) early implementation. In Uganda, there have been
several pilot schemes in the country that have not been
well integrated into national health systems. The differ-
ent schemes also had differences in design features,
which makes studying the evolution of strategic purchas-
ing arrangements difficult in the absence of a national
RBF scheme. However, the diversity in schemes repre-
sents efforts to design RBF arrangements suitable for the
Ugandan context and provided a rich perspective on dif-
ferent innovations in the purchasing function across the
schemes.
Overall, during data collection care was taken to in-
clude all of the main stakeholders and participants in
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the programmes, not just present but over the pro-
grammes’ lifetime, and to cover all the documents avail-
able. As a result, we believe that our data collection and
analysis has captured the key elements of interest for the
selected RBF programmes in each setting, regardless of
the number of interviews carried out and each case
study is sufficiently relevant and rich to provide a
meaningful comparative analysis.
Conclusion
Using available secondary evidence and the insights from
key informants who have been closely linked to the
development of RBF programmes, we examine in this
article preliminary evidence on how RBF programmes
have affected strategic purchasing of health care in
three low-income, crisis-affected countries – DRC,
Zimbabwe and Uganda. We find that the RBF pro-
grammes do not seem to have brought about system-
atic transformation in the health financing and
strategic purchasing architecture, and in some domains,
particularly at government level and in relation to the
population, have not altered arrangements towards more
strategic purchasing. However, importantly, partial im-
provements are noted in some domains, such as creating
more incentives for service delivery and quality for some
services, while also bringing more focus to
output-oriented allocations and data, provider autonomy,
and enabling national policies to improve equity (such as
user fee removal or reduction) to be at least partially im-
plemented. More generally, RBF has been a source of
much-needed revenue at primary care level in
under-funded health systems. The evidence to date sug-
gests that expectations of RBF should be nuanced as RBF
remains an add-on component of payment systems,
while focusing on expanding areas of potential gain
and ensuring better integration and institutionalisa-
tion, which some of the countries described here are
starting to work towards.
Endnotes
1Health Zones in North and South Kivu are covered
by RBF funded by the World Bank, but under different
funding (not PDSS) and slightly different model.
2As a key informant noted, the EUPs created at pro-
vincial level for the purchasing of health services were
called “Fonds d’Achat de Services de Santé” (Health Ser-
vice Purchasing Funds) but this name did not stuck and
instead the term defining their legal status, rather than
their role, remained in use.
3According to the MOH website, RBF is one of the
strategic options under the Institutional Capacity Build-
ing (ICB) Project Phase 2. RBF, which was only with
PNFP facilities in Phase one of the ICB project will,
under phase 2, be expanded to public health facilities.
Implementation will feed national policies for future so-
cial health insurance system development in the country.
Accessed from: http://health.go.ug/projects/institutio-
nal-capacity-building-phase-ii
4www.fbp-rdc.org
5One EUP (Fonds de Développement des Services de
Santé - FDSS) was created at central level in Kinshasa
with the aim of contracting the provincial authorities
and purchasing management services, as well as pur-
chasing inputs for rehabilitation, infrastructure and
equipment.
6Under the FED project, 1 or 2 technical assistants
were assigned to each EUP to support their manage-
ment, oversee their activities and take part in their CA
and CPP. Additionally, a separate NGO (one for each
province) was in charge of ‘coaching’ the facilities, i.e.,
supporting facilities in planning, management, prepar-
ation of business plans, etc. The external technical
assistance and the ‘coaching’ NGOs are not present in
the design of the PDSS project.
Annex 1
The EUP model for strategic purchasing in DRC
The establishment of the Etablissements d’utilité publi-
que (public service agencies - EUPs) in relation to RBF
implementation in DRC is an innovation in terms of in-
stitutional arrangements for the strategic purchasing
compared to the more commonly adopted external
agencies (international NGOs or implementing agen-
cies), or in a few cases Ministry of Health (MoH) struc-
tures. In this box, we provide further details on their
creation, their institutional arrangements and func-
tioning mechanisms.
Four EUPs were created in 2008, the provinces where
the FED programme operated.5 They were composed of
a Director, an administrator and a pool of verifiers. Their
main tasks were contracting facilities (although it is rec-
ognized that negotiation space was very limited), carry-
ing out verification procedures (checking quantity of
services provided, and contracting and managing
community-based organisations for community verifica-
tion), calculating payments owed to each facility, and
paying providers. Based on the latter task, EUPs also
played a fiduciary role at provincial level in holding EU
funds and allocating them to facilities. In terms of insti-
tutional organisation, the EUPs were governed by a
Board of Directors (Conseil d’Administration, CA) com-
posed of representatives at provincial level of the MoH
(DPS), the Ministry of Finance, the General Secretary of
the government, donors, NGOs, civil society (for
example, Catholic Church and/or other organisations),
as well as the director of the EUP. The CA had a role of
strategic orientation and oversight of the EUP. Additionally,
a Provincial Steering Committee (Comité Provinciale de
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Pilotage, CPP) was in place composed of the Director of
the EUP, the DPS, as well as technical assistants and NGOs
involved in the implementation of the FED project,6 with a
more technical role in relation to the implementation of
the RBF programme and of the strategic purchasing
choices (for example, including inclusion/exclusion of
facilities, RBF’s list of indicators and level of payment
to providers) [45].
The PDSS programme opted to make use of the EUP
model as a strategic purchasing agency for RBF. The rea-
sons for this choice are again related to the potential of
the model to ensure the participation of different repre-
sentatives, including of government and MoH, but also
of donors, NGOs and civil society, while at the same
time guaranteeing management autonomy, as well as to
improve the ownership and sustainability of the purchas-
ing agency [18]. The EUPs’ role as strategic purchasing
agency is emphasized in the PDSS Operational Manual.
Indeed, under the PDSS, the RBF approach is often
referred to as ‘strategic purchasing’, with the two terms
almost considered synonymous throughout the
Operational Manual. This points to the role assigned to
RBF in relation to the purchasing function, as an (almost
automatic) enhancer of strategic purchasing within a
system.
New EUPs have been created in the provinces where
the PDSS operates and have a similar organisation to the
EUPs created under the FED programme, with a small
team assigned to each EUP which includes the verifiers,
and a CA composed of representatives of public sector,
civil society, donors and NGOs overseeing its work. The
CPP is now merged with the Technical Working Group
on Health Financing and Universal Health Coverage
(GTT Financement), which is a technical body composed
of the Provincial Health Authorities (DPS), donors and
NGOs already operating at provincial level. The GTT
Financement has a broader health system and UHC
focus not only limited to the management of the RBF
programme, but also in charge of RBF activities, such as
reviewing the payments to be made each quarter and
discussing the results and challenges [18]. While the
EUPs created by the PDSS are in charge of contracting
facilities and carrying out verification, compared to the
EUPs under the FED programme they do not have the
fund-holding and payment role (and therefore the ori-
ginal fiduciary role), which has now been moved to cen-
tral level. Some of the key informants reasoned that this
may be because the new EUPs do not have any technical
assistants embedded in their structure (as the FED pro-
ject EUP did) and therefore it may be riskier for the
donor to allow them to manage funds directly. Others
also stressed that the IT system is now centralized
through a RBF Portal, which in turn allows for a central-
ized payment system. In addition, a second layer of
verification (‘external verification’) has been added by
contracting an international agency to carry out
counter-verification of a random sample of facilities
every 3months.
Abbreviations
BTC: Belgian Technical Cooperation; CA: Board of Directors (Conseil
d’Administration); CPP: Provincial Steering Committee (Comité Provinciale de
Pilotage); DFID: UK Department for International Development;
DPS: Provincial Health Divisions (Divisions Provinciales de Santé);
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo; ECZ: Zonal Health Teams (Equipes
Cadres de Zone); EU: European Union; EUPs: Etablissements d’utilité publique
(public service agencies); FCAS: Fragile and conflict-affected states;
FED: Fonds européen de développement (European Development Fund, EU
RBF programme in DRC); GAVI: Global Alliance on Vaccines Initiative; GTT
Financement: Technical Working Group on Health Financing and Universal
Health Coverage (Groupe Technique de Travail Financement and Couverture
Sanitaire Universelle); HCC: Health Centre Committee; HDF: Health
Development Fund; HMIS: Health management information system;
ISA: Independent Service Authority; KI: Key informants; MCH: Maternal and
child health; MoH(CC): Ministry of Health (and Child Care); NGO: non-
governmental organisation; PBF: Performance based financing;
PCA: ‘complementary package of activities’ for hospitals (DRC);
PDSS: Programme de Développement de Services de Santé (World Bank RBF
programme in DRC); PIU: Project Implementation Unit; PMA: ‘minimum
package of activities’ for health centres (DRC); PNFP: Private not-for-profit;
RBF: Results-based financing; RBM: Results-based management; RHC: Rural
health centre; RMNCH: Reproductive Maternal Neonatal and Child Health;
SDS: Strengthening Decentralisation for Sustainability (health and RBF
programme in Uganda); SIDA: Swedish International Development Agency;
SMGL: Saving Mothers, Giving Lives (RBF programme in Uganda);
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme; UNFPA: United National
Fund for Population Activities; UNICEF: UN Children’s Fund; USAID: United
States’ Agency for International Development
Acknowledgements
We would like to acknowledge all who shared their experiences and views
with us during the data collection for these case studies. Many thanks in
particular to Naike Nembetwa of Bluesquare for facilitating contacts and data
collection in the DRC.
Funding
This work was funded by the Department for International Development
(DFID), UK Aid, under the ReBUILD grant. For the Ugandan component, this
work received contribution from Alliance for Health Policy and Systems
Research at WHO Geneva and SPEED project supported by the European
Union under which the previous round of interviews were carried out.
However, the funders take no responsibility for the views expressed in this
article.
Availability of data and materials
The datasets generated and analysed during the current study are not
publicly available due to protection of confidentiality of participants (given
the difficulty of fully anonymising qualitative transcripts).
Authors’ contributions
SW led the project design, the data collection and analysis for the
Zimbabwe case study and the drafting of the overall paper. MB led the DRC
case study, including data collection and analysis, and contributed to the
overall paper. JN, AS and FS led the Uganda case study, including data
collection and analysis, and contributed to the overall paper. PC and YC
contributed to data collection and analysis of the Zimbabwe case study and
contributed to the overall paper. All have read and approved the final
manuscript.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Ethics approval was obtained from Queen Margaret University’s Research
Ethics Panel. Additional ethics clearance for primary data collected at country
level was also granted by the Makerere University School of Public Health,
Ethics Review Board, and the Uganda National Council for Science and
Witter et al. Global Health Research and Policy             (2019) 4:3 Page 18 of 20
technology (SS4500), as well as the Medical Research Council of Zimbabwe
(MRCZ/A/2265). The study also received authorisation from the MoHCC in
Zimbabwe. Informed consent was obtained from all participants.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Author details
1Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh, UK. 2School of Public Health,
Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda. 3Biomedical Research and training
Institute, Harare, Zimbabwe.
Received: 14 January 2019 Accepted: 15 January 2019
References
1. Bertone M, Falisse J, Russo G, Witter S. Context matters (but how and why?)
a hypothesis-led literature review of performance based financing in fragile
and conflict-affected health systems. PLoS One. 2018;13(4):e0195301.
2. Musgrove P. Rewards for good performance or results: a short glossary; 2011.
3. Fretheim A, Witter S, Lindahl A, Olsen I. The evidence-base for performance
based financing in low- and middle income countries: still more questions
than answers. WHO Bulletin. 2012;90:559–559A.
4. Witter S, Toonen J, Meessen B, Kagubare J, Fritsche G, Vaughan K.
Performance-based financing as a health system reform– mapping the key
dimensions for monitoring and evaluation. BMC Health Serv Res. 2013;13(387).
5. Meessen B, Soucat A, Sekabaraga C. Performance-based financing: just a
donor fad or a catalyst towards comprehensive health-care reform? Bull
World Health Organ. 2011;89(2):153–56.
6. Soucat A, Dale E, Mathauer I, Kutzin J. Pay-for-performance debate: not
seeing the Forest for the trees. Health Syst Reform. 2017;3:74–9.
7. World Health Organisation. Strategic purchasing: an emerging agenda for
Africa. A WHO/CoP PBF & FAHS workshop. Meeting report. 2016.
8. ReSYST. What is strategic purchasing for health? 2014.
9. Murru M, Pavignani E. Democratic Republic of Congo: The chronically-ill
heart of Africa. Provid. Heal. Care Sev. Environ. A Multy-County Study. 2012.
10. Bertone M, Jacobs E, Toonen J, Akwataghibe N, Witter S. Performance-based
financing in three humanitarian settings: principles and pragmatism. Confl
Heal. 2018;12:28.
11. Bwimana A. Heath sector network governance and state-building in south
Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo. Health Policy Plan. 2017;32:1476–83.
12. Witter S, Chandiwana P, Pepukai M, Bertone M, Chirwa Y, Munyati S. The
political economy of results-based financing: the experience of the health
system in Zimbabwe In draft 2018.
13. Macrae J, Zwi A, Gilson L, et al. A triple burden for the health sector reform:
post conflict rehabilitation in Uganda. Soc Sci Med. 1996;42(7):1095–108.
14. Rowley E, Altaras R, Huff K. Health in fragile states, country case study:
northern Uganda; 2006.
15. Ssengooba F, Ekirapa E, Musila T, Ssennyonjo A. Learning from multiple
results-based financing schemes: an anlysis of the policy process for scale-
up in Uganda (2003–2015); 2015.
16. Witter S, Chirwa Y, Chandiwana P, Pepukai M, Munyati S, Bertone M, et al.
Results-based financing as a strategic purchasing intervention: what can we
learn from the experience of Zimbabwe. Forthcoming 2018.
17. Witter S, Naylor M, Caffrey M, Carasso K. Assessment and redesign of the
systems for RBF, human resources for health and pharmaceuticals in
Zimbabwe: final report; 2017.
18. Ministère de la Santé Publique. Manuel opérationnel du Financement Basé
sur la Performance. 2016.
19. Manshande J, Mayaka S, Ramanana-Rahary D. Mission de capitalisation du
projet sante 9ème FED et recommandations pour le PA PNDS; 2010.
20. Zimbabwe Ministry of Health and Child Care. National Results Based
Financing Approach: Programme Implementation Manual. 2016.
21. Ministry of Health. Annual health sector performance report 2009/10. 2009.
22. Ministry of Health. Second National Health Policy. In: Promoting people’s
health to enhance socio-economic development; 2010.
23. World Bank. Uganda reproductive, maternal and child health services
improvement project. 2016.
24. Ministry of Health. Uganda Results Based Financing Framework. 2017.
25. Belgium Technical Cooperation, Ministry of health. BTC MOH newsletter.
Health issues. Issue 1. 2017.
26. Cruz O, Cooper R, McPake B, et al. Is the sector wide approach (SWAp)
improving health sector performance in Uganda? In: Kirunga C, Ssengooba
F, Cruz O, editors. Health systems reforms in Uganda: processes and outputs
London: London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; 2006. p. 29–44.
27. MoFPED. Integrated Financial Management system. 2018.
28. Ministère de la Santé Publique. Comptes Nationaux de la Santé 2015. 2017.
29. Sithole A. Results-based financing in Zimbabwe: any change in the health
delivery system? J Soc Welfare Hum Rights. 2013;1(1):36–46.
30. Shepard D, Zeng W. Cost effectiveness analysis of results based financing in
Zimbabwe and Zambia; 2016.
31. Zimbabwe Ministry of Health and Child Care. Zimbabwe Health Financing
Strategy 2017–20. 2017.
32. Ministry of Health. Uganda Health System Assessment 2011. 2012 2012.
33. Ministry of Health. Health sector strategic and investment plan. Promoting
peoples’ health to enhance socio-economic development. 2010/11–2014/
15. 2010.
34. Ssengooba F, Ssennyonjo A, Namakula J, Kasyaba R, Orach S. Government
resource contribution( GRCs) and their influence on the role of the private
not for profit sector (PNFP) towards achieving universal health coverage in
Uganda (1997–2015); 2018.
35. Ministere de la Santé Publique. Recueil des Normes de la Zone de Santé. 2006.
36. World Bank. Revue des dépenses publiques en RDC - santé. 2014.
37. Crown Agents/HERA. HDF-RBF: Horizontal Equity: Concept Note. 2016.
38. Wright J. Essential package of health services country snapshot: the
Democratic Republic of the Congo; 2015.
39. Moore L, Scott M. Jagmag M, et al. In: Strengthening community
participation in health evaluation; 2017.
40. Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine. Independent evaluation of the
Health Transition Fund in Zimbabwe: final report. 2016.
41. Falisse JB, Meessen B, Ndayishimiye J, Bossuyt M. Community participation
and voice mechanisms under performance-based financing schemes in
Burundi. Tropical Med Int Health 2012 05/01;17(5):674–682.
42. World Bank. Rewarding provider performance to improve quality and
coverage of maternal and child health outcomes. Zimbabwe Results-Based
Financing Pilot Program: Evidence to Inform Policy and Management
Decisions. 2016.
43. Ministry of Health. Patients’ Charter. 2009.
44. Ministry of Health. Sector grant and budget guidelines. FY2017/18. 2017.
45. Mayaka S, Muvudi M, Bertone MP, de Borman N. Le financement basé Sur la
performance en République Démocratique du Congo : comparaison de
deux expériences pilotes. 2011.
46. LSTM Consulting. Final impact assessment of the results-based financing
Programme for northern Uganda . 2015.
47. Dijkzeul D, Lynch C, eds. Supporting local health care in a Chronic Crisis:
Management and Financing Approaches in the Eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo. 2006.
48. Ministry of Health and Child Care. Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Health Financing
Strategy, 2017–20. p. 2017.
49. Chirwa Y, Witter S, Munjoma M, Mashange W, Ensor T, McPake B, et al. The
human resource implications of improving financial risk protection for
mothers and newborns in Zimbabwe. BMC Health Serv Res. 2013;13(197).
50. Ministry of Health. 2009/10 Health financing review 2010.
51. Mathauer I. Performance based financing in fragile contexts: an entry point
for strategic purchasing? 31st; 2018.
52. Mathauer I, Dale E, Meessen B. Strategic purchasing for universal health
coverage: key policy issues and questions. A summary from expert and
practitioners’ discussions . 2017.
53. Eijkenaar F. Key issues in the design of pay for performance programs. Eur J
Health Econ. 2013;14(1):117–31.
54. Collier P. Rethinking the provision of public Services in Post-Conflict States.
Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies; 2009.
55. Sieleunou I, Turcotte-Tremblay A, Yumo HA, et al. Transferring the
purchasing role from international to National Organizations during the
scale-up phase of performance-based financing in Cameroon. Health
Systems & Reform. 2017;3:91–104.
56. ITM. Advanced stages of PBF scale-up: lessons learned from Cameroon on
the transfer of the strategic purchasing function to national agencies -
Policy Brief. 2016.
Witter et al. Global Health Research and Policy             (2019) 4:3 Page 19 of 20
57. Ssengooba F. Performance based contracting: a case study of non- profit
hospitals in Uganda; 2010.
58. Bellows N. Vouchers for reproductive health Care Services in Kenya and
Uganda; 2012.
59. Obare F, Okwero P, Villegas L, et al. Increased coverage of maternal health
services among the poor in Western Uganda in an output-based aid
voucher scheme. 2013.
Witter et al. Global Health Research and Policy             (2019) 4:3 Page 20 of 20
